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RECENT EVENTS stemming from the "war on terrorism" have high-
lighted the prevalence of torture, both as an interrogation technique
and as a punitive measure.1 Torture is almost universally deplored. It
is prohibited by international law and is not officially sanctioned by
the domestic laws of any state. 2 The formal prohibition against torture
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1. For the purposes of this Article, the "use of torture" refers to governmental use of
torture and not to non-government actors.
2. Israel was the last state to officially sanction the practice. TOTSE.CoM, USE OF
TORTURE AGAINST PALESTINIAN POLITICAL PISONERS (Feb. 2000), at http://www.totse.com/
en/politics/theworld -beyond the usa/164142.html (last accessed Mar. 8, 2005). At least
after the Landau Report of 1987, and for some time before, the nature of the conduct
sanctioned by Israel was ambiguous, and precise interrogation methods were classified as
secret. The Israeli Government denied that the interrogation methods employed
amounted to torture. See, e.g., Nili Arad, Israeli Representative, Statement Before the 18th
Session of United Nations Committee Against Torture (May 7, 1997), in ISRAEL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WEB SITE, at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israel+
andTmhe+UN/Speeches+-§tatements/ (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Statement
of Nili Arad]. After the Landau Report of 1987, the Israeli government only admitted to
using "moderate physical pressure" and in some cases "enhanced physical pressure" for
purposes of interrogation, still claiming that this did not amount to torture. In May 1998,
however, the United Nations Committee Against Torture found that the interrogation
methods used in Israel, of which it was aware, constituted torture. Conclusions and Recom-
mendations of the Committee Against Torture: Israe4 U.N. HCHR, 27th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
is absolute-there are no exceptions to it. This is not only pragmati-
cally unrealistic, but unsound at a normative level. Despite the abso-
lute ban on torture, it is widely used. Contrary to common belief,
torture is not the preserve of despot military regimes in third world
nations. For example, there are serious concerns regarding the treat-
ment by the United States of senior Al Qaeda leader Khalid Shaikh
Mohammad. 3 There is also irrefutable evidence that the United States
tortured large numbers of Iraqi prisoners, as well as strong evidence
that it tortured prisoners at Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba, where
suspected Al Qaeda terrorists are held.4 More generally Professor Alan
Dershowitz has noted, "[C] ountries all over the world violate the Ge-
neva Accords [prohibiting torture]. They do it secretly and hypotheti-
cally, the way the French did it in Algeria. 5
Dershowitz has also recently argued that torture should be made
lawful. His argument is based on a harm minimization rationale from
the perspective of victims of torture. He said, "Of course it would be
best if we didn't use torture at all, but if the United States is going to
continue to torture people, we need to make the process legal and
accountable."6 Our argument goes one step beyond this. We argue
that torture is indeed morally defensible, not just pragmatically desira-
CAT/C/XXVII/Concl.5 (2001). Nevertheless, the practices continued without judicial in-
tervention until September 1999 when the Israeli Supreme Court ruled it illegal. Steve
Weizman, Israel Uses Torture in Defiance of Court Ban, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 12, 2001,
available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/story.jsp?story=104447
(last accessed Apr. 18, 2005). Despite this ruling, it has been suggested that the Israeli
authorities continue to use torture. Id. Ken Roth, the executive director of Human Rights
Watch, suggests that Israel ended up torturing around ninety percent of its Palestinian
security detainees until finally the Israeli supreme court outlawed the practice. Interview by
Wolf Blitzer with Alan Dershowitz, Professor of Law, Harvard University, and Ken Roth,
Dershowitz: Torture Could Be Justified (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://edition.cnn.com/
2003/LAW/03/03/cnna.Dershowitz (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Dershowitz
Interview].
3. See, e.g., RichardJ. Wilson, United States Detainees at Guantdnamo Bay: The Inter-Amer-
ican Commission on Human Rights Responds to a "Legal Black Hole", 10 Hum. RTS. BRIEF 2, 3-4
(2003).
4. Legal Definitions of Torture not Black and White, CNN, May 11, 2004, at http://www.
cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/10/torture.legal.ap (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005) ("The [U.S.]
Defense Department is investigating more than forty cases of possible misconduct against
civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, including as many as twelve unjustified deaths. The CIA
inspector general, meantime, is looking into three detainee deaths during or after interro-
gations with agency personnel.").
5. Dershowitz Interview, supra note 2.
6. James Silver, Why America's Top Liberal Lawyer Wants to Legalise Torture, ScoTsMAN
(Scotland), May 22, 2004, available at http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/international.
cfm?id=582662004 (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005) (quoting Alan Dershowitz).
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ble. The harm minimization rationale is used to supplement our
argument.
While a "civilized" community does not typically condone such
conduct, this Article contends that torture is morally defensible in cer-
tain circumstances, mainly when more grave harm can be avoided by
using torture as an interrogation device. The pejorative connotation
associated with torture should be abolished. A dispassionate analysis
of the propriety of torture indicates that it is morally justifiable. At the
outset of this analytical discussion, this Article requires readers to
move from the question of whether torture is ever defensible to the
issue of the circumstances in which it is morally permissible.
Consider the following example: A terrorist network has activated
a large bomb on one of hundreds of commercial planes carrying over
three hundred passengers that is flying somewhere in the world at any
point in time. The bomb is set to explode in thirty minutes. The
leader of the terrorist organization announces this intent via a state-
ment on the Internet. He states that the bomb was planted by one of
his colleagues at one of the major airports in the world in the past few
hours. No details are provided regarding the location of the plane
where the bomb is located. Unbeknown to him, he was under police
surveillance and is immediately apprehended by police. The terrorist
leader refuses to answer any questions of the police, declaring that the
passengers must die and will do so shortly.
Who in the world would deny that all possible means should be
used to extract the details of the plane and the location of the bomb?
7
The answer is not many.8 The passengers, their relatives and friends,
and many in society would expect that all means should be used to
7. "'Everybody says they're opposed to torture. But everyone would do it personally
if they knew it could save the life of a kidnapped child who had only two hours of oxygen
left before death. And it would be the right thing to do.'" Vicki Haddock, The Unspeakable:
To Get the Truth, Is Torture or Coercion Ever Justified, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 18, 2001, at DI (quot-
ing Alan Dershowitz).
8. A recent CNN poll indicated that of the 237,131 votes received, 47% indicated
torture could be justified during interrogation in some circumstances. Poll: Is Torture Ever
Justified During Interrogation?, CNN, May 26, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/POLLSERVER/
results/10612.content.html (last accessed Mar. 22, 2005). A similar poll conducted by Ja-
pan Today asked whether respondents thought torture of captured terrorist suspects is ac-
ceptable if it leads to information that might prevent further attacks or take out terrorist
leaders. Of 1,094 votes counted, 50.9% supported the use of torture in those circum-
stances. Poll: Do You Think Torture of Captured Terrorist Suspects Is Acceptable If It Leads to
InformationThat Might Prevent Further Attacks or Take Out Terrorist Leaders?, JAPAN ToDAY, May
2004, at http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=vote&id=15 7 (last accessed Apr. 18,
2005). It should be noted that the hypothetical described is more extreme than those
adverted to by the polls and hence is likely to generate more support.
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extract the information, even if the pain and suffering imposed on the
terrorist resulted in his death.
Although the above example is hypothetical and is not one that
has occurred in the real world, the force of the argument cannot be
dismissed on that basis. As C.L. Ten notes, "fantastic examples" that
raise fundamental issues for consideration, such as whether it is
proper to torture wrongdoers, play an important role in the evalua-
tion of moral principles and theories. 9 These examples sharpen con-
trasts and illuminate the logical conclusions of the respective
principles to test the true strength of our commitment to the princi-
ples. 10 Thus, fantastic examples cannot be dismissed summarily
merely because they are "simply" hypothetical.
Real life is, of course, rarely this clear cut, but there are certainly
scenarios approaching this degree of desperation,11 which raise for
discussion whether it is justifiable to inflict harm on one person to
reduce a greater level of harm occurring to a large number of blame-
less people. Ultimately, torture is simply the sharp end of conduct
whereby the interests of one agent are sacrificed for the greater good.
As a community, we are willing to accept this principle. Thus, al-
though differing in degree, torture is no different in nature from con-
duct that we sanction in other circumstances. It should be viewed in
this light.
Given this, it is illogical to insist on a blanket prohibition against
torture. Therefore, the debate must turn to the circumstances when
torture is morally appropriate. This is the topic of this Article.
International law defines torture as severe pain and suffering,
generally used as an interrogation device or as a punitive measure.1 2
This Article focuses on the use of torture as an interrogation device
9. C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT AND PUNISHMENT 18-25 (1987). Ten draws a distinction
between a fundamental moral principle (a principle that is notjustified by reference to
some further moral principle) and a secondary moral principle (that has to be justified by
appeal to some further moral principle), and makes the point that fantastic examples play
an important role in relation to the evaluation of fundamental moral principles. Id. at 20.
10. Id.
11. A situation akin to the above example would have arisen if police had appre-
hended the ring leader of the group responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks after
the first plane crashed into the twin towers at New York City's World Trade Center.
12. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, pt. 1, art. 1, at 197, U.N.
Doc.A/29/51 (1984) [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Torture]. As a punitive mea-
sure, it could be argued that torturing wrongdoers will deter them and potential offenders
from committing criminal acts. This justification is unsound, given the empirical evidence
does not support the view that inflicting harsher penalties results in less crime.
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and poses that the device is only permissible to prevent significant
harm to others. In these circumstances, there are five variables rele-
vant in determining whether torture is permissible and the degree of
torture that is appropriate. The variables are (1) the number of lives
at risk; (2) the immediacy of the harm; (3) the availability of other
means to acquire the information; (4) the level of wrongdoing of the
agent; and (5) the likelihood that the agent actually does possess the
relevant information.
Part I of this Article analyzes the meaning of torture and the na-
ture and scope of the legal prohibition against torture. Part II exam-
ines whether torture is morally defensible. It is argued that torture is
no different than other forms of morally permissible behavior and is
justifiable on a utilitarian ethic. It is also argued that, on close reflec-
tion, torture is also justifiable against a backdrop of a non-consequen-
tialist rights-based ethic, which is widely regarded as prohibiting
torture in all circumstances. Thus, the Article concludes that torture is
morally justifiable in rare circumstances, irrespective of which norma-
tive theory one adopts. Part III examines the circumstances in which
torture is justifiable. Finally, Part IV debunks the argument that tor-
ture should not be legalized because it will open the floodgates to
more torture.
I. Torture: Reality and Legal Position
A. The Law on Torture
Pursuant to international law, "torture" is defined as:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instiga-
tion of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions. 13
Torture is prohibited by a number of international documents. 14 It is
also considered to carry a special status in customary international
13. Id.
14. Amnesty International has observed that "numerous new international standards
have been adopted prohibiting torture and setting out governments' obligations to prevent
it. An impressive array of international human rights mechanisms has been put in place to
Spring 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
law, that of jus cogens, which is a "peremptory norm" of customary in-
ternational law. 15 The significance of this is that customary interna-
tional law is binding on all states, even if they have not ratified a
particular treaty. At the treaty level, there are both general treaties
that proscribe torture and specific treaties banning the practice.
In terms of general treaties, torture is prohibited by a number of
international and regional treaties. These include Article 5 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (1948);16 Articles 7 and 10(1) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966);17 Arti-
cle 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950);18 Article
5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights (1978);19 and Ar-
ticle 5 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981).20
In addition to these instruments, which set out a range of human
rights, the international community has implemented specific treaties
addressing torture. The main treaties are the U.N. Convention
Against Torture (1984); the European Convention for the Prevention
of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(1987);21 and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture (1985).22
The rigidity of the rule against torture is exemplified by the fact
that it has a non-derogable status in human rights law. That is, there
are no circumstances in which torture is permissible. This prohibition
is made clear in Article 2(2) of the U.N. Convention Against Torture,
press states to live up to their commitments." AMNESTY INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE: AN
AFFRONT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 2 (2000) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE].
For an excellent overview of the prohibition against torture, see CONOR FOLEY, COMBATING
TORTURE: A MANUAL FORJUDGES & PROSECUTORS §§ 1.9-1.10, available at www.essex.ac.uk/
combatingtorturehandbook/manual (last accessed Feb. 13, 2005). Much of the foregoing
overview of the law of torture is derived from this source.
15. General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession
to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of
the Covenant, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 24, at 52, para. 10, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994).
16. G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
17. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
18. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
19. Nov. 22, 1969, 1114 U.N.T.S. 1243, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 675 (1970).
20. June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982).
21. E.T.S. No. 126 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1152 (entered into
force Feb. 1, 1989).
22. Feb. 28, 1987, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 67, at 83, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1,
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 519 (1986).
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which states, "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture. '23
Thus, the right not to be tortured is absolute.
There are no circumstances in which states can set aside or restrict
this obligation, even in times of war or other emergency threaten-
ing the life of the nation, which may justify the suspension or limi-
tation of some other rights. States are also restricted from making
derogations which may put individuals at risk of torture or ill-treat-
ment-for example, by allowing excessive periods of incommuni-
cado detention or denying a detainee prompt access to a court.
This prohibition operates irrespective of circumstances or attrib-
utes, such as the status of the victim or, if he or she is a criminal
suspect, upon the crimes that the victim is suspected of having
committed.
State officials are prohibited from inflicting, instigating or tolerat-
ing the torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment of any person. An order from a superior officer or a
public authority may not be invoked as a justification for torture.
States are also required to ensure that all acts of torture are of-
fences under their criminal law, establish criminal jurisdiction over
such acts, investigate all such acts and hold those responsible for
committing them to account.24
This absolute prohibition is frequently highlighted by Amnesty
International and other human rights organizations. For example,
Amnesty International states, "The law is unequivocal-torture is ab-
solutely prohibited in all circumstances .... The right to be free from
torture is absolute. It cannot be denied to anyone in any
circumstances." 25
Torture is also prohibited as a war crime, pursuant to humanita-
rian law. 26 In addition, torture is considered to be a crime against hu-
manity when the acts are perpetrated as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population, whether or not they are
committed in the course of an armed conflict. 27
23. U.N. Convention Against Torture, supra note 12, at pt. 1, art. 2.
24. FOLEY, supra note 14.
25. AMNESTY INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE, supra note 14, at 10.
26. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 12 & 50, 75 U.N.T.S.
38, 62; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 12 & 51, 75
U.N.T.S 94, 116; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, arts. 13, 14, 87 & 130, 75 U.N.T.S. 146, 148, 202, 238.
27. Thus, Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), includes torture and rape within the International Criminal
Court's jurisdiction.
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B. The Reality of Torture
As with many legal precepts, the black letter law must be consid-
ered against the context of reality. As this part shows, various forms of
torture are used despite the legal prohibition of it.
1. Forms of Torture
As is noted by Dershowitz, torture comes in many different forms
and intensities:
Torture is a continuum and the two extremes are on the one hand
torturing someone to death-that is torturing an enemy to death
so that others will know that if you are caught, you will be caused
excruciating pain-that's torture as a deterrent .... At the other
extreme, there's non-lethal torture which leaves only psychological
scars. The perfect example of this is a sterilised needle inserted
under the fingernail, causing unbearable pain but no possible
long-term damage. These are very different phenomena. What they
have in common of course is that they allow the government physi-
cally to come into contact with you in order to produce pain.
2 8
Various methods of torture have and continue to be applied in a
multitude of countries. The most common methods are beating, elec-
tric shock, rape and sexual abuse, mock execution or threat of death,
and prolonged solitary confinement. 29 Other common methods in-
clude sleep and sensory deprivation, suspension of the body,30 "shack-
ling interrogees in contorted painful positions" or in "painful
stretching positions,"31 and applying pressure to sensitive areas, such
as the "neck, throat, genitals, chest and head.13 2
2. The Benefits of Torture: An Effective Information Gathering
Device
The main benefit of torture is that it is an excellent means of
gathering information. Humans have an intense desire to avoid pain,
no matter how short term, and most will comply with the demands of
a torturer to avoid the pain. Often even the threat of torture alone will
28. Silver, supra note 6.
29. AMNESTY INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE, supra note 14, at 10.
30. Id.
31. ALLEGRO PACHECO, PUBLIC COMMIrrEE AGAINST TORTURE IN ISRAEL, PROVING TOR-
TuRE: No LONGER NECESSARY IN ISRAEL (1999), at http://intemationalstudies.uchicago.
edu/torture/abstracts/allegrapacheo.html (last accessed Apr. 16, 2005).
32. See id. Many of these "methods" are alleged to have been used in the interrogation
of prisoners by United States military personnel in Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq. See Scott
Higham &Joe Stephens, Secret Detainee Statements Reveal Savagery of Abu Ghraib, AGE (Austl.),
May 22, 2004, at 17; Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEw YORKER, May 10, 2004,
at 42. V
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evoke cooperation. To this end, Dershowitz cites a recent kidnapping
case in Germany in which the son of a distinguished banker was kid-
napped. 33 The eleven-year-old boy had been missing for three days.
The police had in their custody a man they were convinced had per-
petrated the kidnapping. The man was taken into custody after being
seen collecting a ransom that was paid by the boy's family.3 4 During
seven hours of interrogation the man "toyed" with police, leading
them to one false location after another.35 After exhausting all lawful
means of interrogation, the deputy commissioner of the Frankfurt po-
lice instructed his officers, in writing, that they could try to extract
information "by means of the infliction of pain, under medical super-
vision and subject to prior warning."36 Ten minutes after the warning
was given the suspect told the police where the boy was; unfortunately
the boy was already dead, having been killed shortly after the
kidnapping.37
3. The Widespread Use of Torture
a. Torture Around the World
Despite the contemporary abhorrence against it, dozens of coun-
tries continue to use torture. A study of 195 countries and territories
by Amnesty International between 1997 and mid-2000 found reports
of torture or ill-treatment by state officials in more than 150 coun-
tries38 and in more than seventy countries that torture or ill-treatment
was reported as "widespread or persistent."3 9 It is also clear that tor-
33. Silver, supra note 6.
34. Peter Finn, Police Torture Threat Sparks Painful Debate in Germany, WASH. POST, Mar.
8, 2003, at A19.
35. John Hooper, Germany Racked by Torture Controversy, AGE (Ausd.), Feb. 28, 2003, at
http://theage.com.au/articles/2003/02/27/1046064162443.html (last accessed Apr. 18,
2005).
36. Finn, supra note 34.
37. Police Threat Fuels Debate on Torture, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Germany), Feb. 24, 2003, at
http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1430_A_785751,00.html (last accessed Apr. 18,
2005). The precise nature of the warning is not clear. The kidnapper has alleged that he
was told a specialist was being flown to Frankfurt who could inflict on him "pain of the sort
[he] had never before experienced." Hooper, supra note 35. The police deputy commis-
sioner has denied this account but admitted that it was made very plain to the suspect that
they would hurt him until he "identified the whereabouts of the child." Id. The suspect
pleaded guilty at trial, was pronounced guilty of abduction, murder, and blackmail, and
sentenced to life in prison. Associated Press, Schoolboy's Killer Gets Life Sentence, INT'L HER-
ALD TRIB., July 29, 2003, at http://www.iht.com/articles/104393.html (last accessed Apr.
18, 2005).
38. AMNESTY INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE, supra note 14, at 2.
39. Id. at 3. Further, the report concluded that in more than eighty countries people
were reported to have died as a result of being tortured. Amnesty International believes
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ture is not limited to military regimes in third world nations. Amnesty
International recently reported that in 2003 it had received reports of
torture and ill-treatment from 132 countries, including the United
States, Canada, Japan, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany.40 Israel, for
example, officially sanctioned interrogation practices deemed by the
U.N. Committee Against Torture to constitute torture41 until a deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Jus-
tice, in September 1999, ruled a number of these interrogations
unlawful absent any clear statutory authorization. 42 Prior to the Israeli
Supreme Court ruling, the U.N. Committee Against Torture made the
following observations in relation to Israeli interrogation techniques:
[T] he methods of interrogation, which were described by non-gov-
ernmental organizations on the basis of accounts given to them by
interrogatees and appear to be applied systematically, were neither
confirmed nor denied by Israel. The Committee must therefore
assume them to be accurate. Those methods include: (1) re-
straining in very painful conditions, (2) hooding under special
conditions, (3) sounding of loud music for prolonged periods,
that this figure "underestimates" the extent of torture that exists. Id. at 2-3. In its most
recent report, Amnesty claims that "victims of torture and ill-treatment by security forces,
police and other state authorities were reported in 132 countries." AMNESTY INT'L, INTRO-
DUCTION: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2004, at http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/
index-eng (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005).
40. AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2004: TORTURE AND ILL-TREAT-
MENT, available at http://www.amnesty.org/resources/report04/stats-eng/text/03.html
(last accessed Apr. 18, 2005). The United States, Canada, Japan, France, Italy, Spain, and
Germany have all ratified the U.N. Convention Against Torture. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RATIFICATIONS AND RESERVATIONS, at http://
www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005).
41. Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: Israel, U.N. HCHR,
27th Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/XXVII/Concl.5 (2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
tbs/doc.nsf/ (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); see alsoJohn T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interro-
gating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. PI-r. L. REv. 743, 757-60
(2002). The Israeli Government denied the force used in interrogations of Palestinians
constituted torture, claiming that the "State of Israel categorically deplores and prohibits
the practice of torture, including ... against persons under interrogation. Torture is pro-
hibited under Israel Law . . . investigators are never, and never have been, authorized to
use torture, even if its use might possibly prevent some terrible attacks and save human
lives." Statement of Nili Arad, supra note 2. Instead, the Israel government, while accepting
the "prohibition on torture is absolute" claimed that the interrogation techniques used,
which might involve the use of "moderate physical pressure" did not contravene that prohi-
bition. Id.
42. Not all forms of physical interrogation were banned as illegal. In particular, meth-
ods-including sleep deprivation-are allowed if incidental to the interrogation process
and the defense of necessity might be available to interrogators who use physical pressure.
AMNESTY INT'L USA, COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE SAYS ISRAEL'S POLICY OF CLOSURES AND
DEMOLITIONS OF PALESTINIAN HOMES MAY AMOUNT TO CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT (2001), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2001/israel11232001.html (last
accessed Apr. 18, 2005).
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(4) sleep deprivation for prolonged periods, (5) threats, including
death threats, (6) violent shaking, and (7) using cold air to chill,
and are, in the Committee's view, breaches of article 16 and also
constitute torture as defined in article 1 of the Convention. This
conclusion is particularly evident where such methods of interroga-
tion are used in combination, which appears to be the standard
case.
43
Despite the Court's ruling, there is little doubt that the practice
of torture by the Israeli government continues. 44 This may have been
facilitated by the Court's comments that it would accept, in appropri-
ate circumstances, that Israel's General Security Service investigators
might "avail themselves of the 'necessity' defense, if criminally in-
dicted," for using the banned interrogation methods.45 One report
cites official statistics between September 1999 and July 2002 that indi-
cate that during that time ninety Palestinians were defined as "ticking
bombs" and thus subject to interrogation methods that would consti-
tute torture under international law. 46
Indeed, a recent detailed study of forty-eight Palestinian detain-
ees found that interrogees were, in various combinations, frequently
beaten, slapped or kicked, bent and placed in painful positions, vio-
lently shaken, deprived of sleep, shackled behind their backs for pro-
longed periods of cases, cursed at, threatened, degraded, and
deprived of essential needs, including food, water, and medical care
43. Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Torture: Israel, U.N. HCHR, U.N.
Doc. A/52/44 (1997), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ (last accessed Apr.
18, 2005).
44. See generally Associated Foreign Press, Israeli Forces Increasing Use of Torture, GLOBAL
EXCHANGE, Nov. 21, 2001, at http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/palestine/news
2001 /afpl 12101.html.pf (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); see alsoYuvL GINBAR, PUBLIC COMM.
AGAINST TORTURE IN ISRAEL, BACK TO A ROUTINE OF TORTURE: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT
OF PALESTINIAN DETAINEES DURING ARREST, DETENTION AND INTERROGATION-SEPTEMBER
2001-APRIL 2003.
45. Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1486
(1999). Parry and White have recently advocated the introduction of a "necessity" defense
for torture in the United States. They argue that while torture should never be authorized,
a defense of "necessity" should be available to a government agent using torture if that
agent can prove his actions "were necessary to avert a greater, imminent harm." Parry &
White, supra note 41, at 762-63. We suggest that there is little practical difference between
authorizing torture prior to the act and effectively authorizing it by providing the perpetra-
tors with legal defense after the act, save that it makes it more difficult for interrogators to
determine when their actions are justifiable. Parry and White believe this to be a positive,
suggesting that either ignorance of the availability of the defense or uncertainty about
whether the defense would be available would promote deterrence. Id. It is dubious logic,
however, to enact a law that relies on ignorance or ambiguity to achieve the desired result.
46. These are referred to by the authorities as "exceptional means of interrogation."
GINBAR, supra note 44, at 17.
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amongst other things. 4 7 In more than seventy percent of cases, three
or more of these methods were applied. 48 Extrapolating from this and
official data of the number of Palestinian detainees, the study esti-
mated that each month in Israel "ill-treatment reaching the level of
torture as defined in international law is inflicted in dozens of cases,
and possibly more. '4 9
The widespread use of torture is also clearly demonstrated by
even a cursory reading of the most recent U.S. Department of State
Country Information Reports. For example, the report on Turkey pro-
vides that torture, beatings, and other abuses by security forces remain
widespread.50
Security forces reportedly killed 43 persons during the year ....
Security forces continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, al-
though the number of such incidents declined.... The rarity of
convictions and the light sentences imposed on police and other
security officials for killings and torture continued to foster a cli-
mate of impunity. Prosecutions brought by the Government in
State Security Courts (SSCs) reflected a legal structure that favored
government interests over individual rights. . . . Police beat,
abused, detained, and harassed some demonstrators. 51
Likewise, the assessment on Pakistan states:
Security force personnel continued to torture persons in custody
throughout the country. For example, according to Human Rights
Watch (HRW), Rasheed Azam was beaten and tortured at Khuzdar
military cantonment. In September, two prison officials allegedly
beat and killed 18-year-old Sunil Samuel at Camp Jail in Lahore
after he was sexually assaulted by inmates. Over the years, there
have been allegations that common torture methods included:
Beating; burning with cigarettes; whipping the soles of the feet;
sexual assault; prolonged isolation; electric shock; denial of food or
sleep; hanging upside down; forced spreading of the legs with bar
fetters; and public humiliation.52
In relation to China, the report asserts:
The law prohibits torture; however, police and other elements of
the security apparatus employed torture and degrading treatment
47. Id. at 20.
48. Id. at 21.
49. Id. at 22.
50. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TURKEY. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-
2003, at 1 (Feb. 25, 2004) (on file with U.S.F. Law Review) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, TuRKEY]; see also AMNESTY INT'L USA, TURKEY. AN END TO TORTURE AND IMPUNITY IS
OVERDUE! (Oct. 2001), at http://www.amnestysa.org/stoptorture/turkey-torture-report.
rtf (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005).
51. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TURKEY, supra note 50, at 1.
52. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PAKISTAN: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-
2003, at 5 (Feb. 25, 2004) (on file with U.S.F. Law Review).
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in dealing with some detainees and prisoners. The Prison Law for-
bids prison guards from extorting confessions by torture, insulting
prisoners' dignity, and beating or encouraging others to beat pris-
oners. While senior officials acknowledged that torture and co-
erced confessions were chronic problems, they did not take
sufficient measures to end these practices. Former detainees re-
ported credibly that officials used electric shocks, prolonged peri-
ods of solitary confinement, incommunicado detention, beatings,
shackles, and other forms of abuse. Recommendations from the
May 2000 report of the U.N. Committee Against Torture still had
not been fully implemented by year's end. These recommenda-
tions included incorporating a definition of torture into domestic
law, abolishing all forms of administrative detention (including re-
education through labor), promptly investigating all allegations of
torture, and providing training courses on international human
rights standards for police. During the year, police use of torture to
coerce confessions from criminal suspects continued to be a prob-
lem. The 2002 death in custody of Zeng Lingyun of Chongqing
Municipality remained unresolved. On July 26, 2002, public secur-
ity personnel detained Zeng on theft charges. On July 28, his fam-
ily was informed that he had died. Local officials initially told
Zeng's family that he had been shot by police, and the family no-
ticed extensive bruises and a bullet wound on the body. Since the
crackdown on Falun Gong began in 1999, there reportedly have
been several hundred deaths in custody of Falun Gong adherents,
due to torture, abuse, and neglect. 53
In the Philippines a similar picture emerges:
The Constitution prohibits torture, and evidence obtained
through its use is inadmissible in court; however, members of the
security forces and police continued to use torture and to abuse
suspects and detainees. The CHR [Commission on Human Rights]
provides the police with mandatory human rights training, includ-
ing primers on the rights of suspects, and higher level PNP [Philip-
pine National Police] officials seemed more receptive to respecting
the human rights of detainees; however, rank-and-file awareness of
the rights of detainees remained inadequate.
TFDP [The NGO Task Force Detainees of the Philippines] stated that
torture remained an ingrained part of the arrest and detention pro-
cess. Common forms of abuse during arrest and interrogation report-
edly included striking detainees and threatening them with guns. Less
common forms included the placing of plastic bags over heads to de-
53. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHINA (INCLUDEs TIBET, HONG KONG, AND MACAU): COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICEs-2003, at 7 (Feb. 25, 2004) (on file with U.S.F. Law
Review) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHINA] (citations omitted); see also AMNESTY
INT'L USA, TORTURE-A GROWING SCOURGE IN CHINA (Feb. 2001), at http://www.amnesty
usa.org/interfaith/document.do?id=5DE714C0187DFD31802569DD004 1 B35C.
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prive the detainee of air. TFDP reported that arresting officers often
carried out such beatings in the early stages of detention.54
b. The United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantamamo Bay
The United States has also been widely engaged in the practice of
torture in the context of the "war against terrorism." Most recently,
graphic photographs of the torture of Iraqi prisoners occurring at
Abu Ghraib have spread around the world. 5 The photographs show
prisoners bound in painful positions, placed in stress positions, such
as being made to stand with arms outstretched, and forced into sexu-
ally humiliating positions. 56 Other abuses, reported by Major General
Antonio Taguba in a secret report in March 2004, included pouring
cold water on naked prisoners, beating inmates with a broom handle
and chair, threats of rape, sodomy with a chemical light, using dogs to
frighten and intimidate detainees, and forcing detainees to engage in
sexually humiliating conduct, such as being arranged in "sexually ex-
plicit positions for photographing. '57
In addition to the widely publicized photographs of torture oc-
curring at the Abu Ghraib facility in Baghdad, Amnesty International,
the International Committee of the Red Cross, and a variety of other
commentators have reported numerous other instances of torture by
United States personnel since the beginning of the "war on terror."
Instances of torture have been reported primarily in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay, suggesting that the Abu Ghraib incidents
were not merely isolated cases. 58 Among other case studies, Amnesty
54. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PHILLIPINES: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAc-
TICES-2003, at 4 (Feb. 25, 2004) (on file with U.S.F. Law Review).
55. See generally Shock, Outrage Over Prison Photos, CNN, May 1, 2004, at http://www.
cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/30/iraq.photos/ (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005).
56. Id.
57. M.G. ANTONIO M. TAGuBA ET AL., ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILI
TARY Poucy BRIGADE 16-18 (2004), reprinted at BBC NEWS WEB SITE, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/10.5_O4_tagubareport.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005).
This report of the investigation conducted by Major General Taguba is nevertheless la-
beled "Secret/No Foreign Dissemination" but has been published on the BBC News web
site. See also Report Into Baghdad Prison Abuse, BBC NEWS (U.K.), May 5, 2004, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3684825.stm (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005).
58. AMNESTY INT'L, IRAQ: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REVEALS A PATTERN OF TORTURE AND
ILL-TREATMENT (May 26, 2004), at http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/prnt/irq-torture-
eng (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); see also Susan Sontag, Regarding the Torture of Others, N.Y.
TIMES, LATE EDITION, May 23, 2004, at 25; AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
2004: IRAo 3, at http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/2004-irq-summary-eng (last
accessed Apr. 18, 2005); David Barrett, Fresh Bid to Bring Home Guantanamo Britons, ScOTS-
MAN, May 27, 2004, at http://news.scotsman.com/latest.cfm?id=2985571 (last accessed
Apr. 18, 2005); Ken Coates, The Creeping Sickness, GUARDIAN (U.I), Mar. 13, 2004, available
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cites the treatment of Khreisan Khalis Aballey, who was arrested at his
home in Baghdad in April 2003. Amnesty claims that
[d]uring his interrogation at Baghdad's airport detention facility,
he was made to stand or kneel facing a wall for seven-and-a-half
days, hooded, and handcuffed tightly .... At the same time, a
bright light was placed next to his hood whilst distorted music was
played. Throughout this period, he was deprived of sleep and fell
unconscious some of the time. He reported that at one time a US
soldier stamped on his foot, tearing off one of his toenails. The
prolonged kneeling made his knees bloody. .... 59
In another case in April 2003, Abdallah Khudhran al-Shamran
was reported to have been subjected to beatings and electric shocks as
well as other torture methods, including sleep deprivation through
playing constant loud music and "being suspended from his legs and
having his penis tied."60
Even domestically, and prior to the "war on terror," the U.N.
Committee on Torture claimed that American police officers and
prison guards had engaged in various forms of torture and ill treat-
ment on numerous occasions. 61 Of particular concern was the use of
electro-shock stun belts to restrain prisoners. 62 In addition, the United
States has been repeatedly accused of turning over prisoners to other
countries to have them tortured. 63 One official said, "We don't kick
the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries so they
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/guantanamo/story/0,13743,1168592,00.html (last accessed
Apr. 18, 2005); James Grubel, Lawyer Backs Minister's Torture Claim, ADVERTISER (Austl.),
May 19, 2004, at http://www.theadvertiser.news.com.au/common/story-page/0,5963,96
90288%255E911,00.html (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); Patrick Martin, Soldier Beaten at
Guantanamo in Interrogation Training, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE, May 29, 2004, at http://
www.wsws.org/articles/2004/may2004/guan-m29.shtml (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); see
generally AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2004: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
at http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/2004-usa-summary-eng (last accessed Apr.
18, 2005).
59. AMNESTY INT'L USA, IRAQ: HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION AND PROMOTION VITAL IN
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/document.do?id=2305
5999CF853CD680256EB60052AE1C (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005).
60. Id.
61. Elif Kaban, The United Nations Rebukes the U.S. Over Brutality in Prisons, REUTERS,
May 15, 2000, at http://www.prisons.org/un.htm (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); see alsoJa-
mie Fellner, Commentary, Prisoner Abuse: How Different Are U.S. Prisons?, HUM. RTs. WATCH,
May 14, 2004, at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/14/usdom8583.htm (last ac-
cessed Apr. 18, 2005).
62. See Kaban, supra note 61.
63. See, e.g., The Legal Prohibition Against Torture, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Mar. 11, 2003, at
A2; Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST,
Dec. 26, 2002, at A01.
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can kick the [expletive] out of them."64 In terms of the prevalence of
torture in the United States, Dershowitz has noted:
Many of the countries who are signatories to the various conven-
tions routinely torture .... Egypt, Jordan and the Philippines are
signatories-we know those countries torture. How do we know?
Because the United States sends our detainees to those countries
to have them tortured. Hypocrisy is prevailing today. My suggestion
is that if the United States were to authorise torture, we would have
to write a letter to the various signatory organisations saying we
reserve the right under the convention to exclude the following
from the definition of torture . and then we'd list our
exceptions. 65
It is very easy to multiply these examples of torture,66 but enough has
been said to emphasize the distinction between reality and rhetoric
regarding torture.
H. Moral Theory
Broadly, there are two types of normative moral theories. Conse-
quential moral theories claim that an act is right or wrong depending
upon its capacity to maximize a particular virtue, such as happiness.
Non-consequential (or deontological) theories claim that the appro-
priateness of an action is not contingent upon its instrumental ability
to produce particular ends, but rather follows from the intrinsic fea-
tures of the act. Thus, the notion of absolute (or near absolute) rights,
which now dominates moral discourse, is generally thought to sit most
comfortably in a non-consequentialist ethic. This section proves that
torture is permissible pursuant to both of these ethical theories. It is
only consequentialist theories, however, that provide a logical frame-
64. Priest & Gellman, supra note 63, at A02.
65. Silver, supra note 6.
66. See, e.g, AMNESTY INT'L, ALBANIA: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT-AN END TO IMPU-
NITY (May 18, 2001), at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/EUR10012001?OpenDocu-
ment (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); AMNESTY INT'L, BANGLADESH: TORTURE & IMPUNITY
(Nov. 29, 2000), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/engasa130072000?open&of=
Eng-bgd (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); AMNESTY INT'L, EGYr: TORTURE REMAINS RiFE AS
CRIES FOR JUSTICE Go UNHEEDED (Feb. 2001), at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/
MDE120012001?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\EGYPT (last accessed Apr.18, 2005);
AMNESTY INT'L USA, MEXICO: JUSTICE BETRAYED-TORTURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (June
2001), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/stoptorture/mexico-justice-betrayed.pdf (last ac-
cessed Apr. 18, 2005); RENATA CAPELLA & MICHAEL SFARD, PUB. COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN
ISRAEL ("PCATI") & PALESTINIAN SOC'Y FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS & THE
ENV'T ("LAW"), THE ASSASSINATION POLCY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL: NOVEMBER 2000-JANu-
ARY 2002 (May 2002). For a more general discussion of the extent torture see AMNESTY
INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE, supra note 14.
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work within which it is possible to demarcate the circumstances in
which torture is permissible.
Prior to discussing how torture sits in the context of these theo-
ries, an overview of the essential aspects of each of the theories is first
discussed.
A. Non-Consequentialist Rights-Based Theories
The main argument in support of rights-based moral theories is
aptly stated by John Rawls who claims that only rights-based theories
take seriously the distinction between human beings and protect cer-
tain rights and interests that are so paramount that they are beyond
the demands of net happiness. 67
1. The Proliferation of Rights Talk
Charges of this nature have been extremely influential. Following
the Second World War, there has been an immense increase in rights
talk,68 both in sheer volume and the number of supposed rights. The
rights doctrine has progressed a long way since its original modest aim
of providing "a legitimization of ... claims against tyrannical or ex-
ploiting regimes." 69 As Tom Campbell points out, "The human rights
movement is based on the need for a counter-ideology to combat the
abuses and misuses of political authority by those who invoke, as a
justification for their activities, the need to subordinate the particular
interests of individuals to the general good."70
There is now, more than ever, a strong tendency to advance
moral claims and arguments in terms of rights.7 1 Assertion of rights
has become the customary means to express moral sentiments:
" IT] here is virtually no area of public controversy in which rights are
not to be found on at least one side of the question-and generally on
both.17 2 There is no question that "the doctrine of human rights has
67. JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27-28 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971).
68. See TOM CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL POSITIVISM 161-88 (1996) (dis-
cussing the near universal trend towards bills of rights and constitutional rights as a focus
for political choice).
69. Stanley I. Benn, Human Rights-For Whom and For What?, in HUMAN RIGHTS 59, 61
(Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds., 1978).
70. Tom Campbell, Realizing Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM RHETORIC TO
REALITY 1, 13 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 1996).
71. This is almost to the point where it is not too far off the mark to propose that the
"escalation of rights rhetoric is out of control." L. WAYNE SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION
OF RIGHTS 1 (1987).
72. Id.
THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF TORTURESpring 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
at least temporarily replaced the doctrine of maximizing utilitarianism
as the prime philosophical inspiration of political and social
reform." 73
2. Rights Documents
The influence of rights-based theories is demonstrated by the
sheer number of international human rights instruments that most
nations have signed or ratified. The main three of such instruments
are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,74 and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. There are dozens of
rights that are prescribed in one form or another by at least one of
these documents. The scope of these rights includes what can be de-
scribed as basic protections, such as the right to life,75 liberty, and
security of person, 76 and to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.77 There are also the somewhat
vaguer rights, such as the right to the economic, social, and cultural
rights that are said to be indispensable to one's dignity and the free
development of one's personality. 78 Other such rights include the
right to be free from the arbitrary interference with one's privacy,
family, home, or correspondence and from attacks upon one's honor
and reputation.79 Then, there are some so-called rights that are proba-
bly best placed on a wish list, such as the right to rest and leisure8° and
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well being
of oneself and one's family, including food, clothing, housing, and
medical care and necessary social services. 81
3. Influential Contemporary Rights Theorists
Numerous rights-based theories have been advanced as a result of
the colossal, and apparently ever increasing, amount of ethical lan-
guage that is expressed in the form of rights. Rights talk transcends all
73. H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS INJuRISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 196-97 (1983).
74. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICESCR].
75. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 6.
76. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 9.
77. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 7.
78. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 22; ICESCR, supra note 74, at arts. 9 & 15.
79. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 12; ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 17.
80. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 24; ICESCR, supra note 77, at art. 7(d).
81. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 25; ICESCR, supra note 76, at art. 11. The list does
not end there.
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areas of moral discourse. Rights are now the conventional moral cur-
rency. The main differences between them are typically the precise
rights that are acclaimed, the basis of the rights, and the absolutism
with which they apply. The main role of rights in deontological theo-
ries is to protect people from being compelled to do something
against their wishes for the good of another or the general good. Two
of the most influential contemporary rights theories are examined in
the following sections-those of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick.
Many of the observations made in relation to these theories are appli-
cable to most other rights-based theories.
a. Dworkin: Concern and Respect
For Dworkin, rights are "political trumps held by individuals,"8 2
which protect them from the pursuit of common goods. Dworkin
states that " [t] he prospect of utilitarian gains cannot justify preventing
a man from doing what he has a right to do,"'83 and that the general
good is never an adequate basis for limiting rights.84 He asserts that
people have rights when there are good reasons for conferring upon
them benefits or opportunities despite a community interest to the
contrary.85
According to Dworkin, in order to take rights seriously, one
must accept.., one or both of two important ideas. The first is the
vague but powerful idea of human dignity. This idea, associated
with Kant ... supposes that there are ways of treating a man that
are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full member of the
human community, and holds that such treatment is profoundly
unjust.
The second is the more familiar idea of political equality.86
Observance of these ideals leads to the fundamental right of
equal concern and respect, which is the foundation of Dworkin's
rights thesis.8 7 Under this theory, it makes sense to say that a person
has a right if that right is necessary to protect the person's dignity or
his standing as being equally entitled to concern and respect. To treat
one with concern is to treat one as a human being, capable of suffer-
82. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Gerald Duckworth & Co., 4th ed.
1978).
83. Id. at 193.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 194.
86. Id. at 198.
87. Id. at 199; see also Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY
113, 127, 136 (Stuart Hampshire, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1979).
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ing and frustration, 88 and to accord respect is to recognize one as a
human being capable of forming and acting on intelligent concep-
tions of how life should be lived.89
b. Nozick: Rights That Exist in a State of Nature
Robert Nozick's rights theory stems from his analysis of the legiti-
mate role of the state.90 For the purpose of this Article, the end prod-
uct of this state is less important than his picture of morality that
underpins it. Nozick believes that morality is founded on rights. For
him, the rights we have are those that supposedly exist in a state of
nature and derive from our natural liberty.9' This gives rise to several
distinct rights: the right to absolute control over ourselves, the right to
be free from all forms of physical violations, and the right to acquire
property and other resources as a result of the proper exercise of our
personal rights. These rights are contingent upon not violating the
same rights of others. Individuals also have the right to exact retribu-
tion against, and compensation from, those who violate their rights.
Under this theory, moral rights are said to act as side constraints on
the actions of others and cannot be violated even to achieve greater
goods. 92 Thus, on Nozick's account, moral rights are negative rights-
88. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 82, at 272.
89. Id.
90. Nozick begins by imagining that no state exists. He then details the type of state
that is legitimate and the type of state that he believes people would mold consistent with
their moral rights. Through this process he claims that we would arrive at the minimal
state, a position between anarchy and a redistributive state. In this state, fetters on freedom
are few. Individuals have power to own and transfer property and to hire the labor of
others. The state has an extremely minimalist role, its functions being confined to those
that are essentially protective in nature. Basically, the state can only protect against such
matters as force, theft, enforcement of contracts, and so on. It cannot implement paternal-
ist measures or coerce citizens to aid others. Thus, the state cannot assume private prop-
erty or impose taxes in order to, say, redistribute resources to the disadvantaged. Roles
such as this, if they are to be undertaken, must be left to private individuals and enter-
prises. This is the type of state, a pure form of capitalism, that it is claimed will emerge
through an "invisible hand process" by rational people acting in a self-interested manner.
Nozick claims that this type of minimal state is the best manner to ensure that rights are
not violated. A more powerful state would impinge upon individual rights and is, hence,
unjustifiable unless people unanimously waive some of their rights to establish such a state.
ROBERT NOZiCK, ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA 206-07 (Basic Books 1974) [hereinafter
NOzIcK, ANARCHY].
91. Id.
92. Nozick believes that the paramountcy accorded to the right of self-ownership and
liberty is necessary to protect people from the burdensome demands of competing moral
theories such as utilitarianism. For example, he believes only his rights theory can protect
people from such ghastly violations as forced organ donations where the donations would
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there are no positive rights such as the right to welfare or health
care.
93
On the basis of either theory, torture is on its face offensive. For
Dworkin torture does not accord an agent the concern and respect
that is owed to each individual. On the basis of Nozick's account, tor-
ture is indefensible because it directly violates the right to be free
from physical violations.
4. Explanation for the Influence of Rights Theory
There are several responses to rights-based theorists. First, the
fact that a belief or judgment is capable of moving and guiding
human conduct says little about its truth-the widespread practice of
burning "witches" being a case in point. Second, at the descriptive
level, it is probably the case that the intuitive appeal of rights claims
and the absolutist and forceful manner in which they are expressed
has been normally sufficient to mask over fundamental logical defi-
ciencies associated with the concept of rights. Claims couched in the
language of rights seem to carry more emotive punch than equivalent
claims grounded in the language of duties. For whatever reason (per-
haps due to the egocentric nature of rights discourse) the claim that
"I have a right to life" appears to resonate more powerfully than the
maximize happiness by saving the lives of many or assisting those most in need. NozicK,
ANARciv, supra, note 90, at 206-07.
93. Nozick goes on to develop a retributive theory of punishment from his general
moral theory. Nozick advances a communicative theory of punishment in which he claims
that punishment is justified on the basis that it reconnects the offender with the correct
values from which his wrongdoing has disconnected him. Punishment conveys a message
from those with appropriate values to offenders, whose own conduct shows that they pos-
sess incorrect values, that their conduct was wrong. The message aims to affect the criminal
in a way that corresponds with the magnitude of the offense. ROBERT NOZIcK, PHILOSOPHI-
GAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981). Thus Nozick's theory has many similarities with Duff's
theory of punishment, though a significant difference between the theories is that Nozick's
theory is even more purely non-consequential, since in order for punishment to be justi-
fied on Nozick's account there is no need that this message should achieve moral transfor-
mation of the offender; punishment is "right or good in itself, apart from the further
consequences to which it might lead." Id. at 374. There are several specific problems with
Nozick's theory of punishment. It has been noted that if it is irrelevant whether or not
punishment changes the offender or not, then we are still left wondering why the message
must be conveyed in the first place. See NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 81 (1991). Nozick
provides a hint when he states that through punishment the correct values have some
significant effect on the offender's life and make the offender less pleased with his actions.
In this way he argues the offender is encouraged to regret the values that he once held. As
Ten points out, however, this is, in effect, no more than a subtle way of stating that the aim
of punishment is to encourage regret and to achieve deterrence, which are clearly conse-
quentialist considerations from which Nozick is disqualified from resorting. See TEN, supra
note 9, at 42-46.
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assertion that "you have a duty not to kill me." In effect, the much
criticized meta-ethical theory of emotivism, 94 which provides that mo-
rality is a set of utterances that express one's attitude with the aim of
influencing the behavior of others, seems to provide at least a partial
explanation for the influence of rights-based discourse.
The real analysis, however, must move outside of the abstract and
determine how these theories would respond to the use of torture in a
rea* ife scenario.
5. Practical Application of Rights Theories and the Terrorist-Plane
Scenario
Despite the dazzling veneer of deontological rights-based theories
and their influence on present day moral and legal discourse, when
examined closely, such theories are unable to provide persuasive an-
swers to central issues such as: What is the justification for rights? How
can we distinguish real from fanciful rights? Which right takes priority
in the event of conflicting rights? 95 Such intractable difficulties stem
from the fact that contemporary rights theories lack a coherent foun-
dation for rights. Tom Campbell has argued against certain rights-
based theories on the basis that they are unable to provide a satisfac-
tory account of the relationship between concrete rights (rights that
provide ajustification for political decisions by society in general) and
more fundamental rights ("background rights") from which concrete
rights are supposedly derived. 96 An even more fundamental flaw with
rights theories, however, is that there is no defensible virtue that un-
derpins the background interests from which narrower rights claims
can be derived.
When examined closely, the concept of non-consequentialist
rights is vacuous at the epistemological level. It has been argued that
attempts to ground concrete rights in virtues such as dignity, integrity,
concern, and respect are unsound because resort to such ideals is ar-
bitrary and leads to discrimination against certain members of the
community (for example, those with severely limited cognitive func-
94. See, e.g., G. J. WARNOCK, CONTEMPORARY MORAL PHILOSOPHY 24-26 (1967).
95. Mirko Bagaric, In Defence of a Utilitarian Theory of Punishment: Punishing the Innocent
and the Compatibility of Utilitarianism and Rights, 24 AUSTL.J. LEGAL PHIL. 95, 121-43 (1999);
MIRKO BAGARIC, SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT: A RATIONAL APPROACH ch. 4 (2000).
96. See Tom Campbell, Justice 52 (1st ed. 1990).
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tioning) or speciesism (the systematic discrimination against non-
humans) .97
Ultimately, a non-consequentialist ethic provides no method for
distinguishing between genuine and fanciful rights claims and is inca-
pable of providing guidance regarding the ranking of rights in the
event of a clash. It is not surprising then that nowadays all sorts of
dubious rights claims have been advanced. Thus, we have a situation
where individuals are able to hold a straight face and urge interests
such as "the right to a tobacco-free job," the "right to sunshine," the
"right of a father to be present in the delivery room," the "right to a
sex break,"98 and even the "right to drink myself to death without
interference."99
A further flaw with many rights theories, including those of Dwor-
kin and Nozick, is that an absolute right does not exist. Not even the
right to life is sacrosanct. This is evident from the fact that all cultures
sanction the use of lethal force in self-defense. And, indeed, torture-
in the circumstances that we indicate is morally permissible-is in fact
a manifestation of the right to self-defense, which extends to the right
to defend another. By conceding that in some situations conse-
quences must prevail, Dworkin's and Nozick's respective theories be-
come unstable.
Despite the absolute overtones of their theories and their insis-
tence of the importance of the individual, Dworkin and Nozick would
probably, yet reluctantly, respond to the terrorist-plane scenario by
approving of torture in certain circumstances.
Dworkin accepts that it is correct for a government to infringe on
a right when it is necessary to protect a more important right or to
ward off "some grave threat to society."100 In a like manner, Nozick
states that teleological considerations would take over to "avert moral
catastrophe." 10 1 Although both fail to state, even loosely, at what point
a great threat to society or a moral catastrophe exists, so that conse-
quentialist considerations can legitimately "kick in" to guide conduct,
it is tenable to argue that the loss of 300 innocent lives satisfies this
97. See, e.g., Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, in APPLIED ETHICS 64-71 (P.
Singer ed., 1986); Peter Singer, All Animals Are Equa4 in APPLIED ETHICS 215, 215-16 (P.
Singer ed., 1986).
98. These examples are cited by John Kleinig, Human Rights, Legal Rights and Social
Change, in HUMAN RIGHTS 36, 40 (Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds., 1978).
99. Stanley I. Benn, Rights, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY vol. 7, at 196 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967).
100. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 82, at 201.
101. NozicK, ANARCHY, supra note 90, at 95.
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criteria. When consequential considerations are admitted as being rel-
evant, the theories become hybrid and the main theoretical advantage
of a deontological theory, the absolute protection given to people
against certain intrusions, is forsaken. This problem is heightened be-
cause, in both cases, we are given no guidance as to when consequen-
tialist considerations become overriding. At this point rights theories
collapse-they can neither fully rely on the theoretical justifications of
deontological or consequentialist theories.
Nearly twenty years ago, Hart said of rights theories, "It cannot be
said that we have had .. .a sufficiently detailed or adequately articu-
late theory showing the foundation for such rights and how they are
related to other values . . . .Indeed the revived doctrines of basic
rights... are in spite of much brilliance still unconvincing." 10 2 Noth-
ing has changed to diminish the force of this objection.
This may seem to be unduly dismissive of rights-based theories
and to pay inadequate regard to the considerable moral reforms that
have occurred against the backdrop of rights talk over the past half-
century. It cannot be denied that rights claims have been an effective
lever for social change. As Campbell correctly notes, rights have pro-
vided "a constant source of inspiration for the protection of individual
liberty rights."1 03 For example, recognition of the right to liberty re-
sulted in the abolition of slavery and, more recently, the right of
equality has been used as an effective weapon by women and other
disempowered groups seeking greater employment and civil rights,
such as the right to vote.
There is no doubt that there is an ongoing need for moral dis-
course in the form of rights; "[w]hether or not.., rights are intellec-
tually defensible or culturally tolerant, we do have need of them, at
least at the edges of civilization and in the tangle of international
politics."1 0 4 Rather, as is discussed below, the only manner in which
rights can be substantiated is in the context of a consequentialist
ethic. The criticism is with deontological rights-based moral theories
and their absolutist overtones. Theories of this nature are incapable of
providing answers to questions such as the existence and content of
proposed rights. This view could obviously be criticized on the basis
that if non-consequentialist rights are fanciful, then one has difficulty
accounting for the significant changes to the moral landscape for
which they have provided the catalyst.
102. HART, supra note 73, at 195.
103. CAMPBELL, supra note 68, at 165.
104. Id.
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B. Torture and Utilitarianism
There have been a range of consequentialist moral theories ad-
vanced, such as egoism and utilitarianism. The most cogent of these
theories, and certainly the most influential in moral and political dis-
course, is hedonistic act utilitarianism. This theory provides that the
morally right action is that which produces the greatest amount of
happiness or pleasure and the least amount of pain or
unhappiness. 0 5
Utilitarianism has received a lot of bad press over the past few
decades, 10 6 resulting in its demise as the leading normative theory.
There are several reasons for this. The main general argument against
utilitarianism is that because it prioritizes net happiness over individ-
ual pursuits, it fails to safeguard fundamental individual interests. As a
result of this, it has been argued that in some circumstances utilitari-
anism leads to horrendous outcomes, such as punishing the inno-
cent'0 7 or forcing organ donations where the donations would
maximize happiness by saving the lives of many or assisting those most
in need.1 0 8 These outcomes are essentially inflicting harsh pain of one
person for the benefit of others. Another major criticism of utilitarian-
ism is that it supposedly does not accord sufficient weight to individ-
ual interests. As noted above, it has been charged that only rights-
based theories take seriously the distinction between human beings.
This is in contrast to utilitarianism where the ultimate goal-happi-
ness-is aggregative is nature. The happiness of any particular individ-
ual is trumped by the goal of net human happiness.
Against a background of utilitarian ethic, torture is clearly justifia-
ble where the harm caused to the agent will be offset by the increased
happiness gained to other people. 10 9 Utilitarianism has been persua-
sively criticized in the eyes of many, precisely because it justifies sup-
105. SeeJ. J. C. SMART, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR
AND AGAINST 1 (J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams eds., 1973).
106. See, e.g., B. WILLIAMS, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 12-16 (J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams eds., 1973).
107. See H.J. MCCLOSKEY, META-ETHICS AND NORmATIvE ETHICS 180-82 (1969). A similar
example to McCloskey's is provided in E.F. CARRuTT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65
(1947).
108. See NOZICK, ANARCHv, supra note 90, 206-07.
109. See, e.g., JE.EMy BENTHAM, Value of a Lot of Pleasure or Pain, How To Be Measured, in
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Clarendon Press 1907)
(1789). This work has been cited by Dershowitz as providing "the most powerful utilitarian
case for limited torture of convicted criminals to gather information necessary to prevent
serious future crime." Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor
Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 275, 275-76 (2004).
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posedly egregious conduct of this nature. Thus, it can be argued that
the fact that utilitarianism justifies torture indicates that the theory is
flawed. Historically, the same sort of argument has been used most
forcefully in the context that utilitarianism may justify punishing the
innocent. The issue of torturing the innocent is directly discussed in
Part IV.
The most telling theoretical objection against utilitarianism is
that it permits punishment of the innocent. A famous illustration of
the objection concerning punishing the innocent is McCloskey's small
town sheriff example:
Suppose a sheriff were faced with the choice of either framing a
negro for a rape which had aroused white hostility to negroes (this
particular negro being believed to be guilty) and thus preventing
serious anti-negro riots which would probably lead to loss of life, or
of allowing the riots to occur. If he were . . . [a] utilitarian he
would be committed to framing the negro.
110
1. Hard Cases Lead to Hard Decisions
A common utilitarian response to this dilemma is that such exam-
ples are impossible in the real world and hence need not be ad-
dressed.111 Punishing the innocent may at times provide short term
benefits, such as securing social stability. Nevertheless, these benefits
are always more than offset by the likelihood of greater long term
harm due to the loss of confidence in the legal system and the associ-
ated loss of security to all members of the community who will fear
that they may be the next person framed, once the inevitable occurs
and it is disclosed that an innocent person has been punished. But
with only a little imagination, the above example can be tightened up
by introducing considerations that significantly reduce or totally obvi-
ate the possibility of disclosure, so that the only logical utilitarian con-
clusion is to punish the innocent.112 Even if the process of modifying
110. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 107, at 180-81. A similar example to McCloskey's is pro-
vided in EDGAR F. CARRIrr, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1950).
111. See, e.g., T.L.S. Sprigge, A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey, 8 INQUIRY 264, 272
(1965).
112. As an example, McCloskey's hypothetical could be altered by providing that the
town was an isolated one, hence there is no opportunity for help arriving before the riots
occurred. Also the crime should be a murder, not a rape, in which case there is one less
person who could reveal the miscarriage ofjustice that has occurred, and thus the risk of a
possible loss of respect and confidence in the law is not as significant. See also TEN, supra
note 9, at 18. Brandt & Rawls have argued that the utilitarian rule is not necessarily com-
mitted to punishing the innocent. RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY- THE PROBLEMS OF
NORMATIVE AND CRITICAL ETHICS 490-95 (1959); J. Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules 64 PHIL.
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the examples appears to far remove them from the real world, it is still
a situation that the utilitarian must deal with.
The more promising utilitarian response is not to attempt to de-
flect or avoid the conclusion that there may be some extreme situa-
tions where utilitarianism commits us to punishing the innocent or
torturing individuals, but rather the correct approach is to accept this
outcome and contend that, as horrible as this may seem on a pre-
reflective level, on closer consideration it is not a matter that really
insurmountably troubles our sensibilities to the extent that it entails
that any theory that approves of such an outcome must necessarily be
flawed. By drawing comparisons with other situations in which we take
the utilitarian option, it is contended that practices such as punishing
the innocent and torture are not necessarily unacceptable.
The view that punishing the innocent and torturing individuals is
the morally correct action in some circumstances is consistent with
and accords with the decisions we as individuals and societies as a
whole readily have made and continue to make when faced with ex-
treme and desperate circumstances. Once we come to grips with the
fact that our decisions in extreme situations will be compartmental-
ized to desperate predicaments, we do, and should, though perhaps
somewhat begrudgingly, take the utilitarian option. In the face of ex-
treme situations, we are quite ready to accept that one should, or even
must, sacrifice oneself or others for the good of the whole.
For example, in times of war we not only request our strongest
and healthiest to fight to the death for the good of the community,
but we often demand that they do so under threat of imprisonment or
even death. Quite often they must battle against hopeless odds, in cir-
cumstances where we are aware that in all probability they are not
coming back. 1 What is more: they must give their life. Not because
they want to, not because they are bad, but merely because it would be
good for the rest of us. This is classical utilitarian reasoning. Faced
with the reality of the decisions we do make in such horrible situations,
the examples proffered against utilitarianism about the terrible things
it entails, such as punishing the innocent, lose their bite.
REV. 3 (1955). But see H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 8 INQUIRY
249 (1965); TEN, supra note 9, at 67-71.
113. While this is not normally the case, i.e., we normally like to think that we send our
soldiers into situations with at least a fighting chance, there are countless reported in-
stances of men being ordered to go or remain in situations that can only be described as
suicide missions. For those brave men who voluntarily place themselves in such situations,
it is rather illuminating that the proscription against suicide disappears. They are heroes
rather than bad men-they followed the dictates of utilitarianism.
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Horrible situations make for appalling decisions whichever way
we turn, but ultimately we do make the utilitarian choice because of
our lack of true commitment to any higher moral virtue. By opting for
the utilitarian line we are soothed by one saving grace: at least the
level of harm has been minimized. When the good of many or the
whole is at significant threat, we have no difficulty selecting certain
classes of innocent individuals, whose only "flaw" is their sex, state of
health, and date of birth to go in to bat for the rest of us. Their pro-
tests that they should not be compelled to go because it impinges on
their civil, legal, or human rights to such matters as life and liberty, or
their desperate appeals to other virtues such as justice or integrity, fall
on obstinate ears; for this is serious stuff now-our lives (or other im-
portant interests) are at stake. Such appeals should be saved for rosier
times. When advanced in theory, we can all "agree" that this is so.
The decisions we do actually make in a real life crisis are the best
evidence of the way we actually do prioritize important, competing
principles and interests. Matters such as rights and justice are impor-
tant, but, in the end, are subservient to and make way for the ultimate
matter of significance: general happiness. Bad as it seems, framing the
African-American, imprisoning the innocent, and torturing the terror-
ist are certainly no more horrendous than the decisions history has
shown we have made in circumstances of monumental crisis.
A pointed example is the decision by then English Prime Minister
Winston Churchill to sacrifice the lives of the residents of Coventry in
order not to alert the Germans that the English had deciphered Ger-
man radio messages. On 14 November 1940 the English decoded
plans that the Germans were about to air bomb Coventry.' 14 If Coven-
try was evacuated or its inhabitants advised to take special precautions
against the raid, the Germans would know that their code had been
cracked, and the English would be unable to obtain future informa-
tion about the intentions of its enemy.1 15 Churchill elected not to
warn the citizens of Coventry, and many hundreds were killed in the
raid that followed. Many innocent lives were sacrificed in order not to
reveal the secret that would hopefully save many more lives in the
future."16 Significantly, such decisions have subsequently been im-
114. MANUEL VELASQUEZ & CYNTHIA ROSTANKOWSKI, ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE
103-06 (Prentice-Hall 1985).
115. See id.
116. See id. A famous modern day example that comes closest to the dilemma of choos-
ing whether to frame the innocent or tolerate massive abuses of rights followed the Rodney
King beating in Los Angeles on 3 March 1991. The policemen who beat King were acquit-
ted under state law of any offense regarding the incident. Riots ensued resulting in wide-
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mune from widespread or persuasive criticism. This shows not only
that when pressed we do take the utilitarian option, but also that it is
felt that this is the option we should take.
Now, what we actually do does not justify what ought to be done.
Morality is normative, not descriptive in nature: an "ought" cannot be
derived from an "is." 1 ' 7 Still, the above account is telling because the
force of the "punishing the innocent" objection lies in the fact that it
supposedly so troubles our moral consciousness that utilitarianism can
thereby be dismissed because the outcome is so horrible that "there
must be a mistake somewhere." But this claim loses its force when it is
shown that punishing the innocent and torturing the culpable is, in
fact, no worse than other activities that we condone.
2. The Role of Rights in Utilitarian Ethic
The criticism that utilitarianism has no place for rights must be
responded to for the sake of completeness (and in an attempt to fur-
ther redeem utilitarianism). Rights do in fact have a place in a utilita-
rian ethic, and, what is more, it is only against this background that
rights can be explained and their source justified. Utilitarianism pro-
vides a sounder foundation for rights than any other competing the-
ory. Indeed, for the utilitarian, the answer to why rights exist is simple:
recognition of them best promotes general utility. 118 Their origin ac-
cordingly lies in the pursuit of happiness. Their content is discovered
through empirical observations regarding the patterns of behavior
that best advance the utilitarian cause. The long association of utilita-
spread looting, damage to property, and dozens of deaths. Shortly afterwards the
government announced the almost unprecedented step that the policemen, who were
found innocent of the alleged crime, were to be tried on federal charges regarding the
incident. They were duly found guilty, despite the apparent double jeopardy involved. See
DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 23
(1999), for a discussion of this incident. Whatever one's view of the government's motiva-
tion for charging the policemen, it seems that justice took a back seat, at least for a while.
117. This has been used as an argument against a naturalistic view of morality. See,
however, C.R. Pigden, Naturalism, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 421, 422-26 (P. Singer ed.,
1991), where he points out that this phenomenon simply reflects the conservative nature
of logic-you cannot get out of it what you do not put in.
118. According to Mill, rights reconcile justice with utility. Justice, which he claims con-
sists of certain fundamental rights, is merely a part of utility. "[T]o have a right is . .. to
have something which society ought to defend .... [If asked why,]... I can give no other
reason than general utility."J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM 251, 309 (Mary War-
nock ed., Fontana Press, Glasgow, 1986). Campbell also proposes a reductive approach to
rights, however, underlying his rights thesis is not utilitarianism, but rather (ethical) posi-
tivist ideals. CAMPBELL, supra note 68, at 161-85; see also Tom Campbell, The Point of Legal
Positivism, in LEGAL POSITiIsM 323 (Tom Campbell ed., 1999).
THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF TORTURESpring 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
rianism and rights appears to have been forgotten by most. Over a
century ago it was Mill, however, who proclaimed the right of free
speech, contending that truth is important to the attainment of gen-
eral happiness and this is best discovered by its competition with
falsehood.119
Difficulties in performing the utilitarian calculus regarding each
decision make it desirable that we ascribe certain rights and interests
to people that evidence shows tend to maximize happiness12 0-even
more happiness than if we made all of our decisions without such
guidelines. Rights save time and energy by serving as shortcuts to assist
us in attaining desirable consequences. By labeling certain interests as
rights, we are spared the tedious task of establishing the importance
of a particular interest as a first premise in practical arguments.
121
There are also other reasons why performing the utilitarian calculus
on each occasion may be counterproductive to the ultimate aim. Our
capacity to gather and process information and our foresight are re-
stricted by a large number of factors, including lack of time, indiffer-
ence to the matter at hand, defects in reasoning, and so on. We are
quite often not in a good position to assess all the possible alternatives
and to determine the likely impact upon general happiness stemming
from each alternative. Our ability to make the correct decision will be
greatly assisted if we can narrow down the range of relevant factors in
light of pre-determined guidelines. History has shown that certain pat-
terns of conduct and norms of behavior if observed are most condu-
cive to promoting happiness. These observations are given expression
in the form of rights that can be asserted in the absence of evidence as
to why adherence to them in the particular case would not maximize
net happiness.
Thus, importance of rights in a utilitarianism view do not have a
life of their own (they are derivative not foundational), as is the case
with deontological theories. Due to the derivative character of utilita-
rian rights, they do not carry the same degree of absolutism or "must
be doneness" as those based on deontological theories. This is not a
criticism of utilitarianism, however; indeed, this characteristic is a
119. Mill, supra note 118, at 141-83.
120. These rights, however, are never decisive and must be disregarded where they
would not cause net happiness (otherwise this would be to go down the utilitarianism rule
track).
121. SeeJOsEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 191 (Oxford Univ. Press 1986). Raz
also provides that such rights are useful because they enable us to settle on shared interme-
diary conclusions, despite considerable dispute regarding the grounds for the conclusions.
Id.
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strength because it is farcical to claim that any right is absolute. An-
other advantage of utilitarianism is that only it provides a mechanism
for ranking rights and other interests. In the event of a clash, the
victor is the right that will generate the most happiness. As the next
part discusses, the balancing aspect of utilitarianism is the reason that
it is particularly apposite to determining the circumstances in which
torture is appropriate.
M. The Circumstances in Which Torture Is Acceptable
The only situation where torture is justifiable is where it is used as
an information gathering technique to avert a grave risk. In such cir-
cumstances, there are five variables relevant in determining whether
torture is permissible and the degree of torture that is appropriate.
The variables are (1) the number of lives at risk; (2) the immediacy of
the harm; (3) the availability of other means to acquire the informa-
tion; (4) the level of wrongdoing of the agent; and (5) the likelihood
that the agent actually does possess the relevant information. Where
(1), (2), (4) and (5) rate highly and (3) is low, all forms of harm may
be inflicted on the agent-even if this results in death.
A. The Harm to Be Prevented
The key consideration regarding the permissibility of torture is
the magnitude of harm that is sought to be prevented. To this end,
the appropriate measure is the number of lives that are likely to be
lost if the threatened harm is not alleviated. Obviously, the more lives
that are at stake, the more weight that is attributed to this variable.
Lesser forms of threatened harm will not justify torture. Logically,
the right to life is the most basic and fundamental of all human
rights-non-observance of it would render all other human rights de-
void of meaning. 122 Every society has some prohibition against taking
life, 123 and "the intentional taking of human life is . . . the offence
which society condemns most strongly."124 The right to life is also en-
shrined in several international covenants. For example, Article 2 of
the European Convention on Human Rights (which in essence mir-
122. See also MANFRED NowAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
C.C.P.R. COMMENTARY 104 (N.P. Engel ed., 1993); Sarah Joseph, The Right to Life, in THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND UNITED KINGDOM LAw 155
(David Harris & Sarah Joseph eds., 1995).
123. See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 85 (2d ed. 1993).
124. THE HOUSE OF LORDS, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL ETHICS, Vol.
1, at 13 (1994).
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rors Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights) provides that "everyone's right to life shall be protected by
law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the exe-
cution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for
which this penalty is provided by law."125
Torture violates the right to physical integrity, which is so impor-
tant that it is only a threat to the right to life that can justify interfer-
ence with it. Thus, torture should be confined to situations where the
right to life is imperiled.
B. Immediacy of Harm and Other Options to Obtain Information
Torture should only be used as a last resort and hence should not
be utilized where there is time to pursue other avenues of forestalling
the harm. It is for this reason that torture should only be used where
there is no other means to obtain the relevant information. Thus,
where a terrorist has planted a bomb on a plane, torture will not be
permissible where, for example, video tapes of international airports
are likely to reveal the identity of the plane that has been targeted.
C. The Likelihood of Knowledge or Guilt
As a general rule torture should normally be confined to people
that are responsible in some way for the threatened harm. This is not,
however, invariably the case. People who are simply aware of the
threatened harm, that is "innocent people," may in some circum-
stances also be subjected to torture.
Regardless of the guilt of the agent, it is most important that tor-
ture is only used against individuals who actually possess the relevant
information. It will be rare that conclusive proof is available that an
individual does, in fact, possess the required knowledge; for example,
potential torturees will not have been through a trial process in which
their guilt has been established. This is not a decisive objection, how-
ever, to the use of torture. The investigation and trial process is simply
one means of distinguishing wrongdoers from the innocent. To that
end, it does not seem to be a particularly effective process. There are
other ways of forming such conclusions. One is by way of lie-detector
tests. The latest information suggests that polygraphs are accurate
125. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 18, at art. 2.
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about eighty to ninety per cent of the time. 126 There has been little
empirical research done to ascertain the number of innocent people
who are ultimately convicted of criminal offenses. As one example,
however, research carried out in the United Kingdom for the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice suggests that up to eleven percent of
people who plead guilty claim innocence. 127 The wrongful acquittal
rate would no doubt be even higher than this.
Moreover, it is important to note that even without resort to
polygraphs there will be many circumstances where guilt or relevant
knowledge is patently obvious. A clear example is where a person
makes a relevant admission that discloses information that would only
be within the knowledge of the wrongdoer. Another example oc-
curred in the recent German kidnapping case, referred to earlier,
where the man in custody had been witnessed collecting a ransom and
had indicated to the police that the kidnapped boy was still alive.' 28
Where lesser forms of evidence proving guilt are available, the argu-
ment in favor of torture is lower.
D. The Formula
Incorporating all these considerations, the strength of the case in
favor of torture can be mapped as follows:
W+L+P
7x0
Where:
W = whether the agent is the wrongdoer
L = the number of lives that will be lost if the information is not
provided
P = the probability that the agent has the relevant knowledge
T= the time available before the disaster will occur ("immediacy of
the harm")
0= the likelihood that other inquiries will forestall the risk
Wis a weighting that is attributable to whether the agent has had any
direct connection with the potential catastrophe. Where the person is
126. Dan Vergano, Telling the Truth About Lie Detectors, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 2002, availa-
ble at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-09- 0 9 -lie-x.htm (last accessed Apr. 4,
2005).
127. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, UNITED KINGDOM (1993); see also
ROGER HOOD, RACE AND SENTENCING 125 (1992); P. Darbyshire, The Mischief of Plea Bargain-
ing and Sentencing Rewards, CRiM. L. REv. (London), 2000, at 903; M. Zander, What on Earth
Is Lord Justice Auld Supposed to Do?, CRIM. L. REv. (London), 2000, at 419.
128. Police Threat Fuels Debate on Torture, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Germany), Feb. 24, 2003,
available at http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1430 A_785751,00.html (last accessed
Apr. 18, 2005).
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responsible for the incident-for example, planted or organized the
bomb-more emphasis should be attached. Where the agent is inno-
cent and has simply stumbled on the relevant information-for exam-
ple, she saw the bomb being planted or overheard the plan to plant
the bomb-this should be reduced by a certain amount. The prohibi-
tion against inflicting harm on the innocent is certainly strong, but it
is not inviolable.129
Torture should be permitted where the application of the vari-
ables exceeds a threshold level. Once beyond this level, the higher the
figure the more severe the forms of torture that are permissible.
There is no bright line that can be drawn concerning the point at
which the "torture threshold" should be set. More precision can, how-
ever, be obtained by first ascribing unit ranges to each of the above
variables (depending on their relative importance), then applying the
formula to a range of hypothetical situations, and then making ajudg-
ment about the numerical point at which torture is acceptable.
There is obviously a degree of imprecision attached to this pro-
cess and considerable scope for discussion and disagreement regard-
ing the exact weight that should be attached to each variable. It is
important to emphasize, however, that this is not an argument against
our proposal. Rather it is a signal for further discussion and refine-
ment. This is a call that we are confident other commentators will take
up. The purpose of this Article is not to set in stone the full range of
circumstances where torture is justifiable. Our aim is more modest-
to convince readers that torture is justifiable in some circumstances
and to set out the variables that are relevant to such an inquiry.
IV. Regulation Better Than Prohibition
In addition to the moral argument for torture as an interrogation
device, Dershowitz has argued that torture should be legalized for
harm minimization reasons. Dershowitz has pushed for the introduc-
tion of "a torture warrant," which would place a "heavy burden on the
government to demonstrate by factual evidence the necessity to ad-
minister this horrible, horrible technique of torture."130 He further
adds:
129. See discussion supra Part I.
130. Dershowitz Interview, supra note 2. Dershowitz came across the idea for "torture
warrants" while reading about sixteenth and seventeenth century England and France.
While the French were torturing "virtually everybody," the English Privy Council instituted
warrants. This led to about 100 people being tortured over the course of a century. See
Silver, supra note 6.
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I think that we're much, much better off admitting what we're do-
ing or not doing it at all. I agree with you, it will much better if we
never did it. But if we're going to do it and subcontract and find
ways of circumventing, it's much better to do what Israel did. They
were the only country in the world ever directly to confront the
issue, and it led to a supreme court decision, as you say, outlawing
torture, and yet Israel has been criticized all over the world for
confronting the issue directly. Candor and accountability in a de-
mocracy is very important. Hypocrisy has no place.
13 1
The obvious counter to this is the slippery slope argument. "If
you start opening the door, making a little exception here, a little
exception there, you've basically sent the signal that the ends justify
the means," resulting in even more torture.132 The slippery slope ar-
gument is often invoked in relation to acts that in themselves are justi-
fied, but which have similarities with objectionable practices, and
urges that in morally appraising an action we must not only consider
its intrinsic features but also the likelihood of it being used as a basis
for condoning similar, but in fact relevantly different undesirable
practices. 133 The slippery slope argument in the context of torture
holds that while torture might be justified in the extreme cases, legal-
izing it in these circumstances will invariably lead to torture in other
less desperate situations.
This argument is not sound in the context of torture. First, the
floodgates are already open-torture is widely used, despite the abso-
lute legal prohibition against it. It is, in fact, arguable that it is the
existence of an unrealistic absolute ban on torture that has driven tor-
ture "beneath the radar screen of accountability" 134 and that the legal-
ization of torture in very rare circumstances would, in fact, reduce the
instances of torture because of the increased level of accountability.
1 35
Second, there is no evidence to suggest that the lawful violation of
fundamental human interests will necessarily lead to a violation of
fundamental rights where the pre-conditions for the activity are
131. Dershowitz Interview, supra note 2.
132. Id. (quoting Ken Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch). It has
been suggested that Israel ended up torturing around ninety percent of the Palestinian
security detainees they had until finally the Israeli Supreme Court outlawed the practice.
Id.; see also Parry & White, supra note 41, at 757-60.
133. For a discussion of the use and persuasiveness of the argument, see KuMAR
AMARASEKARA & MiRKo BAGARiC, EUTHANASIA, MORALIv AND THE LAW ch. 4 (2002).
134. Dershowitz, supra note 109, at 283.
135. Dershowitz, for example, has stated, "People say '[o] h my God, that will open the
floodgates.' I say the reverse is true. I believe that would close the floodgates. My view is
that accountability ... will reduce the amount of torture rather than increase it." Silver,
supra note 6.
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clearly delineated and controlled. Thus, in the United States the use
of the death penalty has not resulted in a gradual extension of the
offenses for which people may be executed or an erosion in the re-
spect for human life. Third, promulgating the message that the
"means justifies the ends [sometimes]" is not inherently undesirable.
Debate can then focus on the precise means and ends that are
justifiable.
Conclusion
The absolute prohibition against torture is morally unsound and
pragmatically unworkable. There is a need for measured discussion
regarding the merits of torture as an information gathering device.
This would result in the legal use of torture in circumstances where
there are a large number of lives at risk in the immediate future and
there is no other means of alleviating the threat. While none of the
recent high profile cases of torture appear to satisfy these criteria, it is
likely that circumstances will arise in the future where torture is legiti-
mate and desirable. A legal framework should be established to prop-
erly accommodate these situations.
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